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On May 8, 1974, the United States and Canada signed three agree-
ments which significantly expand their air transport relations in the
areas of airline routes, charter flights, and preclearance of passengers
traveling by air between the two countries.
The agreement on airline routes takes the form of the addition of
new routes and the expansion of some existing routes in the U. S.-Canada
Air Transport Agreement of 1966. Services over some of the routes are
deferred for varying periods up to five years in order to assure that the
expansion in transborder air services is orderly. Under the expanded
agreement, there will be the opportunity for U.S. and Canadian airlines
to offer direct air services between a total of thirty-eight cities in the
continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii and seventeen cities in
Canada. Of these cities, twenty-nine in the United States and 11 in
Canada will receive either first or expanded direct airline services be-
tween the two countries when new routes are operated.
The Agreement on Air Transport Preclearance provides for im-
proved facilities and support for U.S. Customs and Immigration offices
presently clearing U.S.-bound passengers at four Canadian departure
points (Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, and Vancouver). The agreement
also provides for introducing preclearance at seven other Canadian air-
ports (Halifax, Quebec, London, Ottawa, Calgary, Edmonton, and Vic-
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toria) and thirteen U.S. airports (Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas/
Fort Worth, Denver, Honolulu, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York,
Newark, San Francisco, and Tampa) at such time as traffic justifies it
and adequate facilities are available.
The Nonscheduled Air Service Agreement will, for the first time,
permit airlines of both countries to operate charter flights under a bi-
laterally-agreed regime, rather than under the unilaterally controlled con-
ditions which have so far prevailed. Generally, airlines of either country
will be required to operate three charters originating in their own coun-
try for every four which originate in the other country (a so-called uplift
ratio). However, because certain U.S.-Canada charter markets consist
almost entirely of Canadians traveling to the United States, exceptions to
the uplift ratio are provided in certain instances, particularly for charter
flights by U.S. airlines between Canada and Hawaii, California, Nevada,
Arizona, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Instead,
the volume of such charter traffic by U.S. airlines will not exceed certain
agreed percentages of the total volume of charter traffic moving in the
markets indicated. These percentages will eventually reach 25% of the
Hawaii and Florida markets and 40% of all the indicated markets com-
bined. In view of certain problems over accepting current Canadian
rules on inclusive tour charters, the full implementation of rights in
certain areas is held in abeyance under reservations attached by both
Governments to the agreement.
It should be noted that the nonscheduled agreement includes a
United States' reservation which has the effect of precluding the opera-
tion of one-step ITC's (inclusive tour charters) destined to the conti-
nental United States for the duration of the reservation. In this con-
nection, the Board stated that, pending any withdrawal of the U.S.
reservation, it is in the public interest to require that all ITC's to the
continental United States operated by the Canadian charter carriers pro-
vide overnight hotel accommodations at a minimum of two places at
least fifty miles apart. Finally, the Board stated that it intended to be
guided by the Agreement and section 1102 of the Federal Aviation Act
in considering requests for prior approval of such charters in the ab-
sence of compelling circumstances justifying a different result.
A supplemental exchange of notes includes a mutual commitment to
implement the Agreement to the extent possible even before licenses and
permits are revised and reissued by the respective Governments. In re-
sponse to this commitment, the Board granted appropriate waivers of its
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charter regulations to certain Canadian and U.S. air carriers insofar as
such regulations would otherwise prevent the carriers from operating the
services as provided for in the nonscheduled agreement.
At this writing, the only other U.S. nonscheduled agreements were
a Memorandum of Understanding with Belgium, signed on October 17,
1972, and a Nonscheduled Air Service Agreement with Yugoslavia, signed
on September 27, 1973.
SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT
The Civil Aeronautics Board on July 24, authorized the summary
seizure of a Philippine Air Lines DC-10 aircraft upon its arrival at San
Francisco via Honolulu and the aircraft was in fact seized and impounded
by a U.S. Marshal. The purpose of the seizure was to insure the collec-
tion of any civil penalty imposed or compromised with respect to such
operations. The Board had previously disapproved the carrier's proposed
schedules providing for the substitution of DC-10 for DC-8 aircraft in re-
sponse to the Philippines' long standing restrictive civil air policies and
had expressly ordered that the DC-10 operations not be inaugurated. The
Board's order stated that in such circumstances the carrier had no au-
thority pursuant to its foreign air carrier permit (as conditioned by
Part 213 of the Board's Economic Regulations) to operate the wide-bodied
aircraft into or out of the United States. The Board also stated that
neither the sovereignty of the United States air transportation system nor
the integrity of the Board's regulatory processes could tolerate such open
disregard of an order issued by the Board and submitted to the President.
On July 28, the carrier deposited a $200,000 bond and the aircraft was
released.
Subsequently, Diplomatic Notes were exchanged between the Gov-
ernments of the United States and the Philippines providing for an
interim agreement concerning capacity in the U.S.-Philippines market
pending further negotiations. In response to these developments, the
Board on August 9 authorized Philippine Air Lines to operate up to
three weekly scheduled flights with DC-10 aircraft between Manila and
San Francisco via Honolulu until further order of the Board.
FARES
On July 30, 1974, the Civil Aeronautics Board approved an Inter.
national Air Transport Association (IATA) agreement providing fuel.
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related fare increases of 5% in North Atlantic and four percent in Mid-
Atlantic services. The Board stated that the increases were fully war-
ranted by actual fuel cost increases already experienced by the carriers
involved and that the fares, which became effective on August 1, would
help compensate for further price escalations. Although the Board last
December and March approved increases of 6% and 7% in transatlantic
fares respectively, and considering the increases which this agreement
provides, the U.S. airlines involved (Pan American World Airways, Trans
World Airlines and National Airlines) on a composite basis, will be more
than $43 million short of fully recovering actual fuel cost increases up
to the date of the Board's approval. It was recognized that the current
decline in North Atlantic traffic may be due, at least in part, to fare
increases approved earlier and that the increases approved in this in-
stance may accentuate that trend. The Board pointed out, however, that
air fares are only part of the total cost of an average trip to Europe, and
that other factors such as inflation on both sides of the Atlantic, as well
as currency fluctuations, had also played a part in the decrease of trans-
atlantic traffic during the summer. The Board also noted that the addi-
tional fare increase would result in a minimal increase in the carriers'
rates of return, but pointed out that while National was experiencing
excellent earnings in its transatlantic service, Pan American and TWA
were realizing returns that were clearly inadequate and would remain
so even at the higher fares. Therefore, the Board concluded that prompt
recoupment was not only warranted but necessary to the maintenance of
scheduled service.
TRAVEL GROUP CHARTER RULES
The Civil Aeronautics Board has adopted without modification the
tentative findings it made last March in its proposal to liberalize Travel
Group Charter (TGC) rules in an attempt to enhance their marketability
while preserving the legally required distinction between charter service
and individually ticketed service. The revised regulations became effec-
tive August 12.
In its notice of proposed rule making, the Board proposed to amend
the TGC rules to (1) reduce the deadline for filing the original partici-
pants list from ninety to sixty days in advance of the flight date; (2) al-
low a TGC to be filed so long as at least 90% of the contracted seats were
sold to original participants; (3) eliminate the standby list for eligible
assignees of TGC participants and, instead, permit original participants
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to assign their TGC contractual rights and obligations to members of the
general public; and (4) reduce the maximum number of permissible
assignments from 20% to 15% of the number of listed original partici-
pants.
Although there was some opposition to the Board's proposal to allow
a TGC to be filed when at least 90% of the seats were sold to partici-
pants (instead of 100% as formerly required), the Board was not per-
suaded to withdraw this liberalizing feature.
The Board also made final its proposal that if less than 100% of
the contracted seats were sold by the time the TGC is filed, then no
additional seats may thereafter be sold, although seats contracted for may
continue to be assignable by individual participants at any time prior
to flight departure. The Board, in explaining why it permitted this limited
right of assignment to extend to members of the general public, rather
than only to persons named on a filed standby list, stated that TGC par-
ticipants must be allowed some opportunity to be relieved from total for-
feiture of their charter payments by the availability of a limited right of
assignment. Since standby lists have not effectively served that purpose,
limited assignments to the general public should be tried. In this con-
nection, the Board rejected the argument that such a limited right of
assignment would stimulate speculators to participate in TGCs since the
rules do not permit assignments to be made for profit. In adhering to
its proposal to reduce the number of permissible assignments from 20%
to 15% of the listed original participants, the Board stated that the
slight restriction in the number of permissible assignments was designed
to provide some offset against the relaxation of the requirements on
eligibility for assignments.
U.S. FLAG CARRIERS' FINANCIAL PROBLEMS
On June 25, the House Transportation and Aeronautics Subcommittee
held public hearings concerning several bills that would provide financial
assistance to U.S. international air carriers. At that time, the Subcom-
mittee heard testimony from the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board
and the Secretary of Transportation each of whom presented differing
views concerning the ultimate solutions to the problems that continue
to plague the U.S. flag carriers. Generally, the Board favors a program
of direct Federal subsidy for a limited period of time, while DOT op-
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poses financial assistance and favors an alternate program of affirmative
economic actions. Both positions were presented to the Subcommittee
in prepared testimony.
DOT's so-called "Federal Action Plan" proposes to place the U.S.
flag international carriers in an economically viable position through a
series of affirmative actions. More specifically, the "Action Plan" would
involve: (1) a series of steps to deal with rates which are too low, too
complicated, or not properly enforced; (2) a continuing effort to identify
routes to be abandoned or combined with another carrier; (3) reduc-
tion of capacity on international routes that is far in excess of country-
to-country demand; (4) initiation of a "fly U.S. flag" program to en-
courage U.S. residents to travel on U.S. carriers; and (5) the reduction
of foreign discrimination against U.S. carriers through such practices as
the imposition of excessive navigation and landing fees. The Secretary
stated further than in seeking solutions to the current problems, the
United States must be guided by long-term objectives that will assure
U.S. air passengers and shippers adequate, reliable, and low-cost service
to foreign countries; establish fares and tariffs reasonably related to
the cost of providing the service; permit U.S. air carriers to compete
fairly in international markets on viable economic terms; and assure
respect for U.S. bilateral and multilateral air agreements. While voicing
opposition to proposed legislation authorizing Federal subsidies for the
U.S. flag international carriers, the Secretary stated that if the plan
was successful, it should avoid the need for additional legislation or short-
term subsidy.
While agreeing with the Secretary that Federal financial assistance
should be a matter of last resort, the Board's Chairman disagreed on the
issue of whether alternative measures would be sufficient to maintain
the U.S. international air transport system in reasonably good health for
the short term. In this connection, the Chairman stated that in view
of sufficiently high risks to the system, legislation providing for Fed-
eral financial assistance ought to be adopted. The Chairman outlined
the Board's reasons for its position.
The Chairman pointed out that the world's airlines, especially U.S.
international carriers, have of late incurred serious financial losses and
noted that while the profits of U.S. trunkline carriers' profits from
domestic operations increased by almost $100 million (comparing the
first quarter of this year with the first quarter of 1973), the profits from
international operations decreased by almost $40 million (a $64 million
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loss in the second quarter). The Chairman presented three major rea-
sons for the current problem: (1) a significant decline in international
traffic, which the Chairman stressed as being a real decline and not
simply a drop-off in growth rates; (2) a trend toward the shifting of
passengers to charter and other forms of group travel; and (3) a sudden
and drastic upsurge in fuel prices to the extent that international fuel
prices paid by U.S. carriers increased from about 13 cents per gallon
in July of 1973 to about 33 cents last April (an increase of about 1507o).
As was stated by the Chairman, these developments have substantially
weakened the financial positions of Pan American and TWA, the two
U.S. scheduled carriers that rely most heavily on their international
business. It was noted that when the fuel crisis emerged, Pan American
was about to return to profitability after five consecutive years of losses,
totaling $180 million. As an indication of the magnitude of the losses
that have been sustained in recent months, the Chairman stated that for
the first four months of 1974, Pan American's net loss after taxes was
about $31 million with TWA's net loss being even worse at $51 million.
In attempting to mitigate these losses, the carriers have sought, and the
Board has granted, rate and fare increases in the form of fuel surcharges;
attempted to rationalize their route systems through route swaps and
suspensions; entered into a number of capacity limitation agreements;
and grounded aircraft and reduced their work forces. In this connection,
it was stated that although the Board had taken positive action to
achieve long-term solutions to the carriers' problems, no combination of
possible corrective actions can prevent Pan American and TWA from
suffering serious financial losses in 1974. Furthermore, the Chairman
testified that it was the Board's judgment that corrective actions may not
be sufficient to obviate the risk of serious financial harm befalling one
or more U.S. carriers next year.
It was recognized by the Chairman that Congress has given the
Board the responsibility for fostering sound economic conditions in air
transportation, and, that in light of that responsibility, the Board had
concluded that, at the present, there was no available remedy short of
Federal financing to lessen the risks to the health of the U.S. interna-
tional air transportation system. Finally, the Chairman stated that while
the bills that were pending before the Subcommittee presented certain
problems and difficulties, the Board should be given authority to provide
financial assistance to U.S. international carriers for a limited period
during which time the carriers would be required to bring their opera-
tions into line with the economic realities of today.
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AIRPORT X-RAY UNITS
On June 21, 1974, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
issued a proposed regulation that would govern the installation and safe
operation of X-ray devices for screening carry-on luggage at airports.
In addition to providing for the training of operators of this equipment and
protection of them on the job, the proposal would assure that all X-ray
units used by the airlines in their security programs comply fully with
performance standards for that equipment recently issued by the Food
and Drug Administration of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. The airlines began introducing X-ray units in the spring of
1973 to meet FAA requirements that they search all baggage and other
items that passengers intend to carry on the airplane. The equipment is
used only for the inspection of carry-on items. It is not used to screen or
search passengers.
FAA said it believes the FDA performance standards for airport
X-ray units provide adequate radiation protection both for operators of
this equipment and the traveling public. For example, the agency noted
that the radiation leakage standards for the X-ray units are the same as
those for television sets, and that the X-ray units utilize very low radia-
tion dosages which are only about one-tenth that given off by a wrist
watch with a radium dial and one-ten-thousandth that of a dental X-ray.
There are approximately two-hundred X-ray units in operation at
some sixty-three airports around the country. All of these systems meet
the FDA safety standards and will continue in operation pending final
action on the FAA proposal. Although use of this equipment was chal-
lenged in the courts by a consumer group resulting in an order from the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia prohibiting their use,
the presiding judge subsequently agreed to stay his order after receiving
assurances that the FAA would initiate rule making action that would
afford the public an opportunity to comment on the use of such equip-
ment at airports.
Among other things, the proposal would require the airlines to post
signs notifying passengers concerning the use of X-ray equipment to
screen carry-on baggage and advising them to remove all X-ray and
scientific film from their baggage prior to inspection. FAA said tests
conducted by the Eastman Kodak Company have shown that normal
radiation dosages of less than one milliroentgen used for each X-ray will
not damage standard film but could affect scientific film. However, if
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the X-ray system being used exposed carry-on luggage to more than one
milliroentgen during the inspection, this fact also would have to be
posted and passengers advisd to remove all film from their baggage.
Finally, the proposed regulation would prohibit the use of any X-ray
equipment for which the FDA had issued a defect or modification order
because of potential injury, including genetic injury to operators or
passengers.
AEROSAT AGREEMENT
Since mid-1971, the ATC and communications satellite project known
as AEROSAT has been under intensive discussion and negotiation. The
system is intended to provide the information upon which to base a
follow-on operational system expected- to be required in the mid-1980's.
Thus, on May 9, 1974, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding for a joint inter-
national program to test, evaluate, and demonstrate the use of aeronautical
satellites to provide communications and air traffic services over the North
Atlantic. Other participants are Canadet and the ten countries of the Euro-
pean Space Research Organization (ESRO): Belgium, Denmark, France,
West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and
Switzerland. Formal signing by ESRO and Canada was completed on
August 2. The satellite will be jointly owned by ESRO, Canada, and a
U.S. private sector co-owner to be named subsequent to the signing of the
agreement by all parties. FAA's use of the satellite will be on a lease basis
from the U.S. co-owner. Two satellites in synchronous orbit over the
Atlantic are planned with the first launch scheduled in late 1977 or early
1978.
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
An FAA staff study has concluded that failure of shippers to comply
with regulations governing the packing, marking, labeling, and document-
ing of hazardous materials is the major problem associated with the
carriage of hazardous materials in aviation as well as other transportation
modes.
The evaluation is 'the result of an investigation conducted by staff
members of FAA's Flight Standards Service last March and April, in five
FAA regions. The investigations, which included interviews with FAA
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Regional and Air Carrier District Office (ACDO) personnel, focused on
three areas: the adequacy of each Region's surveillance and enforcement
programs; the ACDO standard operating practices and the extent of their
employee training in the handling ard documentation of hazardous ma-
terials shipments; and inspection of actual shipments of hazardous materials
at air carrier and freight forwarder facilities.
Stressing the intermodal nature of the problem, the FAA report notes
that 90% of the shipments found to be in noncompliance with FAA
regulations during the evaluation period also failed to meet the shipping
regulations governing the surface modes of transportation that brought
these materials to the air carrier or freight forwarder loading docks.
Concurrent with the evaluation, the FAA has been moving to strength-
en its hazardous materials surveillance program. Specific actions include:
* Eighteen hazardous materials coordinators have been assigned to
FAA regional offices and the number of those in the field involved
in hazardous materials activities on a part-time basis has been in-
creased to 103. The eighteen positions were not filled at the time of
the evaluation in March-April.
* A comprehensive handbook providing policy guidance for hazard-
ous materials inspectors was published on August 6. The study team
found that the lack of handy, written guidance material was one of
the most significant problems affecting the FAA hazardous materials
program.
* A survey has been conducted by a separate FAA group to deter-
mine the number of flights carrying hazardous cargo, particularly
air carriers. This data is expected to help FAA identify the most
frequently used shipping points where it can concentrate its inspection
efforts.
In addition to outlining the actions taken by FAA as a result of the
special field investigations, the report lists the steps taken by the agency
within the past eighteen months in general response to the increasing
volume of hazardous materials being shipped by air. These include:
* A hazardous materials training course has been established for
FAA Inspectors. Some 203 Inspectors have completed the course.
* A separate course for airlines, air taxis, freight forwarders and
shippers 'has been established. Some seventy-three persons have com-
pleted this four-day course which is being conducted by the Trans-
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portation Safety Institute at the FAA Aeronautical Center in Okla-
homa City.
* A Notice of Proposed Rule Making (No. 74-18), published on
April 15, 1974, would provide that no person may carry any danger-
ous article in an aircraft unless the outside container has been
inspected to determine that, from all outward aspects, it complies with
packaging, marking and labeling requirements of FAA. The Notice
also proposes that packages containing radioactive materials and
appropriate parts of the aircraft be scanned with a radiation monitor-
ing instrument.
* The number of hazardous materials inspections conducted by FAA
in 1973 totaled 9073, compared to a total of 571 for the previous
two years, 1971-1972. The number of inspections during 1974 is
expected to substantially exceed .the 1973 level.
SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT
On Sunday, March 3, 1974, shortly after takeoff from Paris, France,
a McDonnell Douglas DC-10 aircraft operated by THY Airlines of Turkey
crashed killing all 346 persons on board. Prompted by striking similarities
between the Paris disaster and a June 1972 incident involving a DC-10
aircraft in the United States, the Subcommittee on Aviation conducted an
investigation into the events surrounding the Paris crash. Before the Sub-
committee began its investigation, botlh U.S. and French accident investi-
gators had reached the preliminary or tentative conclusion that the Paris
disaster was caused by the separation of the aft bulk cargo door from the
aircraft while the aircraft was climbing to its assigned cruising altitude and
that the sequence of events subsequent to the separation rendered the flight
controls incapable of controlling the aircraft.
The Subcommittee's hearing and investigation was not designed as a
formal inquiry subject to due process requirements nor was there any
intention to establish any probable cause or legal, financial or moral
liability or responsibility for the accident. The Subcommittee's concern was
to ascertain whether the U.S. Government agencies involved in civil air
safety, namely the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) had properly exercised
their respective responsibilities in regard to the DC-10 problem which
came to light in 1972. Therefore, the inquiry was limited to an assessment
of the effectiveness of governmental policy and regulatory activities aimed
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at providing the traveling public the safest air transport system possible.
As indicated below, according to the Subcommittee the investigation re-
vealed certain deficiencies in governmental action.
The Subcommittee's report found that the FAA, in dealing with the
problem of the cargo door on the DC-10 following the June 1972 incident,
failed to take the proper regulatory action in seeking to ensure that a
repeat of the near catastrophic door failure did not occur. The report
concluded that when a serious or potentially catastrophic problem develops
in a transport category aircraft, the public interest and safety requires
strong regulatory action on the part of the FAA and that issuance of
Airworthiness Directives rather than Service Bulletins is the only proper
way to proceed. (The Airworthiness Directive has the force and effect of
law while compliance with 'Service Bulletins is voluntary on the part of
the operator and may be ignored if the operator choses.) The Committee
also expressed concern with respect to the FAA's failure to adequately
follow up what action it did take after the 1972 incident and Douglas
Aircraft's failure to take remedial action on -the cargo door situation as
warranted by the circumstances. It was stated, however, that the committee
believed that the Administrator was acting honestly and in good faith in
dealing with the DC-10 problem and truly believed that the serious danger
posed by the problem could be alleviated through the Service Bulletin
process. Nevertheless, the report stated that testimony from the Committee's
hearings indicated that there was less than total compliance with the
Service Bulletins dealing with the cargo door and that in at least one
instance a U.S. registered aircraft was not modified pursuant to the
applicable Service Bulletin until after the Paris accident. The report
recognized that proper door closure eliminated the possibility that the
door would inadvertently come open in flight and that proper and secure
closure was possible without the modifications provided for in the FAA's
Service Bulletin.
The report also found fault with the NTSB for failure to adequately
follow up its recommendations on the DC-10 door problem and for its
closing of the file on its DC-10 safety recommendation (to install venting
between the cargo and passenger compartments) even though the FAA
had not taken action initiating the proposed recommendation.
Finally, the Committee stated its belief that the regulatory process
designed to protect the public from unsafe conditions which could lead to
air transportation disasters was circumvented in the DC-10 cargo door
situation and indicated that it expected better performance in the future.
It should be noted that subsequent to the Committee's hearings, the FAA
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Administrator, in a statement to the Committee, indicated that he had
directed the use of Airworthiness Directives in all future situations where
a design change is needed to correct an unsafe condition.
ANTIHIJACKING ACT OF 1974
On August 5, 1974, the Antihijacking Act of 1974 was signed into
law. The new legislation amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 so as
to implement the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft; to provide a more effective program to prevent aircraft piracy;
and for other purposes. The following are some of the more significant
provisions of the new legislation.
TITLE I
Special Aircraft Jurisdiction oJ the United States
The definition of the term "special aircraft jurisdiction of the United
States" contained in existing law has been expanded in two major respects.
First, the definition is extended to include the following two categories of
aircraft not covered by existing law:
(1) Any aircraft outside the United States having "an offense" (as
defined in the Hague Convention) committed aboard, if the aircraft
lands in the United States with the alleged offender still aboard; and
(2) Other aircraft leased without crew to a lessee who has his
principal place of business in the United States or, if he has no such
place of business, he has his permanent residence in the United States.
Second, the definition in existing law is changed with respect to when
an aircraft is "in flight." Existing law provides that an aircraft is in
flight "from the moment power is applied for the purpose of takeoff until
the moment when the landing run ends." The new definition provides
that an aircraft is in flight "from the moment when all external doors
are closed following embarkation until the moment when one such door
is opened for disembarkation, or in the case of a forced landing, until
the competent authorities take over the responsibility for the aircraft
and for the persons and property aboard". These amendments implement
provisions contained in Art. 3 and 4 of the Hague Convention.
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Aircraft Piracy
The new provisions provide that a person aboard an aircraft in
flight outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States com-
mits "an offense" (as defined in the Hague Convention) when he un-
lawfully seizes or exercises control of the aircraft by force or threat of
force, or by any other form of intimidation, or attempts to perform any
such act or is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to
perform any such act. The new provisions apply only if the place of
take off or landing of the aircraft on which the offense is committed is
situated outside the State of registration of the aircraft, thus excluding
coverage of what might be called "domestic" aircraft hijacking. Also in-
corporated in the new provisions is the definition of the term "in flight"
as it is used in the Hague Convention and discussed above under the
definition of special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. Existing
law is also amended to provide that violations of the new provisions shall
be investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Hijacking Attempts
The legislation added a new paragraph (3) to section 902 (i) of
existing law, dealing with the "attempt" to commit aircraft piracy, which
provides that such an "attempt" is within the special aircraft jurisdiction
of the United States even though the aircraft is not in flight at the time
of the attempt, if it would have been within such special aircraft juris-
diction of the United States had the offense of aircraft piracy been com-
pleted. This amendment extends the jurisdictional limits for attempted
aircraft hijackings to encompass attempted aircraft hijackings which do
not occur in flight, and is intended to proscribe attempted aircraft hi-
jackings even when the hijacker is rendered incapable of completing the
hijacking in flight because he has sustained an injury or for some other
reason.
Death Penalty
The new amendments provide that the penalty for the offense of
"aircraft piracy" committed outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the
United States shall be imprisonment for not less than twenty years, except
that, if the death of another person results from the commission or at-
tempted commission of the offense, the penalty could be death or imprison-
ment for life. Also amended was the penalty provision contained in existing
law so as to make the penalty for "aircraft piracy" committed uithn the
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special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States identical with the penalty
which may be imposed for such offense committed outside the special
aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. In either case, the imposition of
the death penalty would be subject to specific procedural requirements
which are contained in a new section 903(c).
Suspension of Air Services
The provisions relating to suspension of air services are contained in
a new section 1114. Subsection (a) provides that whenever the President
determines that a foreign nation is acting in a manner inconsistent with
the Hague Convention or, if he determines that a foreign nation permits
the use of its territory as a base of operations or training or as a sanctuary
for, or in any way arms, aids, or abets, any terrorist organization which
knowingly uses the illegal seizure of aircraft or the threat thereof as an
instrument of policy, he may -
(1) suspend the right of any air carrier or foreign air carrier to
engage in foreign air transportation, and suspend the right of any
person to operate aircraft in foreign air commerce, to and from the
offending nation; and
(2) suspend the right of any foreign air carrier to engage in foreign
air transportation, and the right of any foreign person to operate
aircraft in foreign air commerce, between the United States and any
foreign nation which continues to maintain air services between itself
and the offending nation.
The President may exercise his authority under this sub-section without
notice or hearing and for as long as he deems necessary to assure the
security of aircraft against unlawful seizure. This subsection further pro-
vides that, notwithstanding section 1102 of existing law, the President's
suspension authority shall be deemed to be a condition-
(1) to any certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by
the Civil Aeronautics Board and to any permit issued by the Board
to any foreign air carrier or foreign aircraft; and
(2) to any operating certificate or specification issued by the
Secretary of Transportation to any air carrier or foreign air carrier.
Subsection (b) of the new section 1114 makes it unlawful for any air
carrier or foreign air carrier to engage in foreign air transportation, or
for any person to operate any aircraft in foreign air commerce, in viola-
tion of any suspension of rights imposed by the President.
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Security Standards in Foreign Air Transportation
The provisions relating to security standards are contained in a new
section 1115. The new section provides for the maintenance of minimum
security measures in foreign air transportation by requiring the Secretary
of Transportation to notify a foreign nation whenever, after consultation
with the aeronautical authorities of that nation, he finds that such nation
does not effectively maintain and administer security measures relating to
foreign air transportation equal to or above the minimum standards
established pursuant to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
The Secretary is also required to notify such nation of the steps considered
necessary to bring its security measures up to the minimum standards. In
the event that nation fails to take such steps, the Secretary of Transporta-
tion may, with the approval of the Secretary of State, withhold, revoke,
or impose conditions on the operating authority of the airlines of that
nation. In addition this section requires the Secretary of State to notify
each nation which has a bilateral air transport agreement with the United
States, and each nation with airlines which hold foreign air carrier per-
mits under existing law of the provisions of this section.
Civil Penalties
The new legislation amends section 901 (a) of existing law, relating
to civil penalties, to provide that any person who violates the provisions
of the new section 1114 relating to suspension of air services shall be sub-
ject to a civil penalty of not to exceed $1,000 per day.
Enforcement by Attorney General
Section 1007 (a) of existing law, relating to judicial enforcement, is
also amended to authorize the Attorney General to apply to the district
courts of the United States for the enforcement of the new section 1114.
TITLE II
Title II of the Act (which may be cited as the Air Transportation
Security Act of 1974) amended Titles III and XI of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 (the Act), by adding several new sections and amending
existing provisions of the Act.
Screening of Passengers
The new section 315 of the Act provides that the Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration shall prescribe or continue in effect
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reasonable regulations requiring that all passengers and all property to be
carried in the aircraft cabin in air transportation or in intrastate air
transportation be screened by weapon-detecting procedures or facilities
employed or operated by employees or agents of the air carrier, intrastate
air carrier, or foreign air carrier prior to boarding the faircraft for such
transportation.
Air Transportation Security
The new section 316 of the Act provides that the Administrator shall
prescribe such reasonable rules and regulations requiring such practices,
methods, and procedures, or governing the design, materials, and con-
struction of aircraft, as he may deem necessary to protect persons and
property aboard aircraft operating in air transportation or intrastate air
transportation against acts of criminal violence and aircraft piracy.
Carrying Weapons or Explosives Aboard Aircraft
Section 902 of the Act was amended to provide that whoever, while
aboard, or while attempting to board, any aircraft in, or intended for
operation in, air transportation or intrastate air transportation, has on or
about his person or his property a concealed deadly or dangerous weapon,
which is, or would be, accessible to such person in flight, or any person
who has on or about his person, or who has placed, attempted to place, or
attempted to have placed aboard such aircraft any bomb, or similar ex-
plosive or incendiary device, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Authority to Refuse Transportation
Section 1111 of the Act was amended to provide that the Admin-
istrator shall, by regulation, require any air carrier, intrastate air carrier,
or foreign air carrier to refuse to transport -
(1) any person who does not consent to a search of his person, to
determine whether he is unlawfully carrying a dangerous weapon, explo-
sive, or other destructive substance, or
(2) any property of any person who does not consent to a search
or inspection of such property to determine whether it unlawfully contains
a dangerous weapon, explosive, or other destructive substance.
Subject to reasonable rules and regulations prescribed by the Adminis-
trator, any such carrier may also refuse transportation of a passenger or
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property when, in the opinion of the carrier, such transportation would or
might be inimical to the safety of flight.
Liability for Certain Property
Title XI of the Act was amended by adding the new section 1116
providing that the Civil Aeronautics Board shall issue such regulations or
orders as may be necessary to require that any air carrier receiving for
transportation as baggage any property of a person traveling in air trans-
portation, which property cannot lawfully be carried by such person in
the aircraft cabin by reason of any Federal law or regulation, shall assume
liability to such person, at a reasonable charge and subject to reasonable
terms and conditions, within the amount declared to the carrier by such
person, for the full actual loss or damage to such property caused by such
air carrier.
Definitions
Section 101 of the Act was amended by adding the following new
definitions:
(1) Intrastate air carrier means any citizen of the United States who
undertakes, whether directly or indirectly or by a lease or any other
arrangement, to engage solely in intrastate air transportation.
(2) Intrastate air transportation means the carriage of persons or
property as a common carrier for compensation or hire, by turbojet-
powered aircraft capable of carrying thirty or more persons wholly
within the same State of the United States.
While there appears to be no legislative history on the issue, presumably
the foregoing definitions are to apply only to the security provisions of
the Act and are not intended to be in any way applicable to the economic
regulatory provisions of the Act.
RECENT U.S. CASE LAW
D'Arcy v. Delta Air Lines, 13 Avi. Cas. 17,113 (1974)
In this case the court had before it a motion to dismiss a wrongful
death action filed in the state of New York arising from an air flight that
originated in Vermont and was scheduled to land in Massachusetts. Al-
though the decedent was a citizen and resident of Connecticut at the time
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of his death, he had for many years worked in New York and paid New
York state and city income taxes. Furthermore, the contract of carriage
was made by the decedent with the defendant air carrier in New York
and the ultimate destination on the decedents ticket was New York City.
The defendant air carrier contended that New York had no significant
contacts with the case and that the interests of justice would be best served
by a trial either in Connecticut or Massachusetts. The court recognized
that what was critical to both sides of the issue was that if the case were
tried in either Massachusetts or Connecticut, the Massachusetts Wrongful
Death Statute would be applied and would operate to limit the amount of
the plaintiffs' recovery, whereas if the action were tried in New York, the
Massachusetts Wrongful Death Statute would not be applied. In holding
that the motion to dismiss the wrongful death action should be granted,
the court stated that forum non conveniens relief should be granted when
it plainly appears that New York is not a convenient forum.
Mason v. Belieu, 13 Avi. Cas. 17, 114 (1974)
In this case the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia had before it rather bizarre factual circumstances requiring a deter-
mination pursuant to the antidiscrimination provision of the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958, section 404 (b), 49 U.S.C. 1374. The plaintiff had been
deported from the Panama Canal Zone and forcibly placed aboard a com-
mercial aircraft bound for Miami, Florida, where, upon arrival, the plain-
tiff promptly made arrangements to take the next available return flight
and notified his family accordingly. In the interim, the defendant air
carier had been notified of the plaintiffs deportation and the circum-
stances surrounding his presence in the United States by the carrier that
had brought the plaintiff to Miami from the Tocumen Airport in Panama.
Thereafter, when the plaintiff presented himself at the defendant air car-
rier's gate for embarkation on his return flight to Panama, he was politely
but firmly denied passage by the carrier's Assistant Airport Service Man-
ager. The plaintiff seeks damages for the mental distress and severe in-
convenience caused by the defendant air carrier's failure to transport the
plaintiff and the distress to plaintiff's wife caused by a delayed arrival and
the resulting detention of plaintiff by Panamanian authorities.
The court stated that there was no doubt that the plaintiff had a valid
contract for passage to Tocumen Airport and that the defendant's em-
ployee's action in preventing the plaintiff from boarding the flight, absent
justification, violated that contract and plaintiffs right to travel on an air
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carrier without suffering "unjust discrimination or any undue or unreason-
able prejudice or disadvantage." Although the deportation order had been
brought to the attention of the defendant's employee, it could not be used
to justify a refusal to transport the defendant because there was no in-
dication that the employee relied upon it for that purpose. Although the
defendant air carrier argued that its employee's actions were reasonably
calculated to protect the safety of the departing plane and its passengers
from a possible hijacking, the court concluded that, in light of the em-
ployee's knowledge of the circumstances, the plaintiff's odd behavior and
late arrival at the gate in no way reasonably suggested an intention to
hijack the aircraft. The court also noted that the defendant's employee
neither questioned the plaintiff about his intentions nor had him specially
searched for weapons.
Concluding that the plaintiff had established unjust discrimination on
the part of the defendant air carrier, the court stated that the plaintiff was
entitled to actual damages for the violation of his right to passage aboard
a common carrier including compensation for plain and blatant instances
of humiliation and outrage, and awarded the plaintiff $1,000. With respect
to the damages claimed by the plaintiff's wife, the court stated that her
injuries were genuine but slight and awarded the sum of $200 for the
emotional distress that was caused by the defendant's failure to give a valid
explanation for plaintiff's failure to arrive as scheduled. The court re-
jected other claims for consequential damages and stated that punitive
damages would be inappropriate in the absence of proof that the defend-
ant's employee acted wantonly, or oppressively, or with malice. The sum
of $150 was awarded for court costs.
Air Line Pilots Association v. Civil Aeronautics Board, Case Nos.
73-1214 et al (D.C. Ar., filed 1974).
In this case the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia had before it various groups of airline employees challenging
the Board's approval of the airlines' Mutual Aid Pact, as amended.
The Pact was created in 1958 by six airlines representing a joint
effort to soften the impact of strikes against individual companies. Orig-
inally the Pact provided only for "windfall payments" whereby a strike-
bound company received payments from other Pact members equal to their
increase in revenues resulting from the strike minus their added operating
expenses in servicing the diverted business. The Pact was then amended
to provide for "supplemental payments" which enabled a carrier member
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to receive 25% of its normal air transport operating expenses for opera-
tions shut down by a strike. However, a 1969 amendment to the Pact
raised that figure to 50% for the first fourteen days of the strike and then
decreasing by stages to 35% after a strike period of four weeks or longer
with additional payments over windfall to meet this allotment contributed
by each member in the proportion which its air transport operating rev-
enues bore to the total revenue for all members. While individual carrier
liability for supplemental payments was limited at first to one-half of 1%
of the carrier's intake for the prior year, that limitation was increased in
1969 to 1% by agreement of the Pact members.
The employee groups argued that the Pact, as approved, violated the
national labor policy, the Railway Labor Act, and the antitrust laws. It
was also contended that there was no substantial evidence to support the
Board's finding that the Pact was not adverse to the public interest. While
the primary thrust of the unions' attack concerned the Board's approval
of the increase in supplemental payments rates and the higher ceiling on
individual carrier liability, the employee groups also contested the Board's
consent to a 1971 amendment to the Pact authorizing the participation of
the local service carriers. In affirming the Board's orders approving the
amendments to the Pact, the court made several notable observations.
At the outset the court recognized that United States labor policy has
at its very foundation the principle that parties should be free to marshall
the economic resources at their disposal in the resolution of a labor dispute,
consistent with the specific rights and prohibitions established by the labor
statutes. The court stated that while the Federal Aviation Act established
certain procedures that must be followed in the direct bargaining phase
of a dispute, once those procedures were exhausted without reaching an
agreement, there is no prohibition against parties resorting to economic
self-help measures in an attempt to weather the economic realities of a
strike until a favorable settlement can be negotiated. In this connection,
the court noted that the permissibility of the Pact under the Railway Labor
Act was adequately supported by U.S. case law as well as section 20 of the
Clayton Act and section 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act which sanction
the payment of benefits to parties engaged in a labor dispute. Finding that
the Board's approval of the Pact was fully consistent with the national
labor policy and the Railway Labor Act, the court cited the Board's spe-
cific conclusion that the Pact had not inhibited good faith bargaining and
had not become an employer device for the control of the formation of
bargaining units. It was also concluded that the Board's findings were ade-
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quately supported by the record and that the result reached was reason-
able. In disposing of the antitrust arguments of the employee groups, the
court pointed out that the initial forum in which to raise such objections
was the agency that is charged with the primary determination of the
public interest and since there was no indication that such objections were
raised in that forum, the court was precluded from considering the anti-
trust attack absent any reasonable grounds for failure to pursue that attack
before the agency. The Board's orders approving the Pact were affirmed.
